By Davide Debortoli, Ricardo Nunes and Pierre Yared
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:upf:upfgen:1504&r=dge
This paper develops a model of optimal government debt maturity in which the government cannot issue state-contingent bonds and cannot commit to fiscal policy. If the government can perfectly commit, it fully insulates the economy against government spending shocks by purchasing short-term assets and issuing long-term debt. These positions are quantitatively very large relative to GDP and do not need to be actively managed by the government. Our main result is that these conclusions are not robust to the introduction of lack of commitment. Under lack of commitment, large and tilted positions are very expensive to finance ex-ante since they exacerbate the problem of lack of commitment ex-post. In contrast, a flat maturity structure minimizes the cost of lack of commitment, though it also limits insurance and increases the volatility of fiscal policy distortions. We show that the optimal time-consistent maturity structure is nearly flat because reducing average borrowing costs is quantitatively more important for welfare than reducing fiscal policy volatility. Thus, under lack of commitment, the government actively manages its debt positions and can approximate optimal policy by confining its debt instruments to consols.
Interesting intuition that solves the government’s lack of commitment. It will, however, be difficult to sell to the public that the government debt is never going to be reimbursed, seeing how difficult it is already to make them understand that government debt is not like household debt. Can thus the government really commit to finance only through consols?
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