Organizational Equilibrium with Capital

December 24, 2018

By Marco Bassetto, Zhen Huo and José-Víctor Ríos-Rull

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedhwp:wp-2018-20&r=dge

This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept – organizational equilibrium – for models with state variables that have a time inconsistency problem. The key elements of this equilibrium concept are: (1) agents are allowed to ignore the history and restart the equilibrium; (2) agents can wait for future agents to start the equilibrium. We apply this equilibrium concept to a quasi-geometric discounting growth model and to a problem of optimal dynamic fiscal policy. We find that the allocation gradually transits from that implied by its Markov perfect equilibrium towards that implied by the solution under commitment, but stopping short of the Ramsey outcome. The feature that the time inconsistency problem is resolved slowly over time rationalizes the notion that good will is valuable but has to be built gradually.

This is not an easy paper and one that will take time to digest. However, this organizational equilibrium opens interesting avenues for the study of economic (and other) policies where the limited time horizon of policy makers leads to time inconsistencies.

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Uneven gains: the macroeconomic and welfare effects of the business tax reform

December 20, 2018

By Oliver Pardo

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000416:017011&r=dge

This paper assess the macroeconomic and welfare effects of the 2017 tax reform in the US. This assessment is carried out by simulating the enacted business tax cuts in a dynamic general equilibrium model calibrated to replicate the household income distribution in the US. The simulation suggests that the cuts will lead to increases in investment, wages and output, although the welfare gains are quite unevenly distributed across households. Long-run investment increases by one percentage point of the baseline GDP, leading to a 1.3% increase in the steady-state wages and a 1.7% increase in the steady-state output. However, there is a sudden and permanent drop in tax revenue equivalent to 0.5% of the baseline GDP. The necessary cuts in government spending imply that households in the poorest quintile may face a welfare loss equivalent to 1.6% of the GDP. Mean-while, households in the richest quintile can expect a gain of 4.4% of the GDP. Overall, the welfare gains of all households add up 4.7% of the GDP. Hence, the aggregated welfare gains from all but the richest quintile is barely positive.

While the results are hardly surprising, it is nice to see a first evaluation of this tax policy using serious modeling. There should be more of it.


Collateral Booms and Information Depletion

December 13, 2018

By Vladimir Asriyan, Luc Laeven and Alberto MartĂ­n

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:1064&r=dge

We develop a new theory of information production during credit booms. In our model, entrepreneurs need credit to undertake investment projects, some of which enable them to divert resources towards private consumption. Lenders can protect themselves from such diversion in two ways: collateralization and costly screening, which generates durable information about projects. In equilibrium, the collateralization-screening mix depends on the value of aggregate collateral. High collateral values raise investment and economic activity, but they also raise collateralization at the expense of screening. This has important dynamic implications. During credit booms driven by high collateral values (e.g. real estate booms), the economy accumulates physical capital but depletes information about investment projects. As a result, collateral-driven booms end in deep crises and slow recoveries: when booms end, investment is constrained both by the lack of collateral and by the lack of information on existing investment projects, which takes time to rebuild. We provide new empirical evidence using US firm-level data in support of the model’s main mechanism.

This is an interesting take at the slow recovery for the Great Recession. I am also wondering how this theory could explain endogenous herding behavior during such a boom.


Quantitative Easing

December 6, 2018

By Wei Cui and Vincent Sterk

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cfm:wpaper:1830&r=dge

Is Quantitative Easing (QE) an effective substitute for conventional monetary policy? We study this question using a quantitative heterogeneous-agents model with nominal rigidities, as well as liquid and partially liquid wealth. The direct effect of QE on aggregate demand is determined by the difference in marginal propensities to consume out of the two types of wealth, which is large according to the model and empirical studies. A comparison of optimal QE and interest rate rules reveals that QE is indeed a very powerful instrument to anchor expectations and to stabilize output and inflation. However, QE interventions come with strong side effects on inequality, which can substantially lower social welfare. A very simple QE rule, which we refer to as Real Reserve Targeting, is approximately optimal from a welfare perspective when conventional policy is unavailable. We further estimate the model on U.S. data and find that QE interventions greatly mitigated the decline in output during the Great Recession.

This is a very interesting paper on a policy that is still poorly understood.