October 17, 2018
By Brant Abbott, Giovanni Gallipoli, Costas Meghir and Giovanni L. Violante
This paper examines the equilibrium effects of alternative financial aid policies intended to promote college participation. We build an overlapping generations life cycle model with education, labor supply, and consumption/saving decisions. Cognitive and non-cognitive skills of children depend on the cognitive skills and education of parents, and affect education choice and labor market outcomes. Driven by both altruism and paternalism, parents make transfers to their children which can be used to fund education, supplementing grants, loans and the labor supply of the children themselves during college. The crowding out of parental transfers by government programs is sizable and thus cannot be ignored when designing policy. The current system of federal aid is valuable: removing either grants or loans would each reduce output by 2% and welfare by 3% in the long-run. An expansion of aid towards ability-tested grants would be markedly superior to either an expansion of student loans or a labor tax cut. This result is, in part, due to the complementarity between parental education and ability in the production of skills of future generations.
The best way to finance is an important issue and this paper shows that it matters. It also demonstrates that education should not be free, but its cost in the end should be tailored to the financial abilities of the parents. The worst outcome is if the government is not involved at all, and this even if student ability is correlated with parental wealth.
October 17, 2018
By Spencer Lyon and Michael Waugh
Should a nation’s tax system become more progressive as it opens to trade? Does opening to trade change the benefits of a progressive tax system? We answer these question within a standard incomplete markets model with frictional labor markets and Ricardian trade. Consistent with empirical evidence, adverse shocks to comparative advantage lead to labor income loses for import-competition-exposed workers; with incomplete markets, these workers are imperfectly insured and experience welfare losses. A progressive tax system is valuable as it substitutes for imperfect insurance and redistributes the gains from trade. However, it also reduces the incentives to work and for labor to reallocate away from comparatively disadvantaged locations. We find that progressivity should increase with openness to trade and that progressivity is an important tool to mitigate the negative consequences of globalization.
This is an interesting take on how to address the losers from globalization. But when you think a little about it, this is like tax progressivity helping to redistribute income during a recession, except that in the latter case you also have to tool of public deficits.
October 14, 2018
By Baris Kaymak and Immo Schott
We document a strong empirical connection between corporate taxation and the labor’s share of income in the manufacturing sector across OECD countries. The estimates indicate that the decline in corporate taxes is, on average, associated with 40% of the observed decline in labor’s share. We then present a model of industry dynamics where firms differ in their capital intensity as well as their productivity. A drop in the corporate tax rate reduces the labor share by shifting the distribution of production towards capital intensive firms. Industry con- centration rises as a result, and firm entry falls, consistent with the US experience documented in Kehrig and Vincent (2017) and Autor et al. (2017). Calibration of the model to the US economy indicates that corporate tax cuts explain at least a third of the decline in labor’s share in the US manufacturing industry.
The secular(?) decline in the labor income share is cause for a a lot of speculation, especially as it seems to happens in several countries simultaneously. This paper presents an interesting take at this question: it is to a good part due to declining corporate tax rates and the ensuing market concentration. The narrative makes sense and the numbers seem to back it up well.
October 14, 2018
By Juan Carlos Conesa; Bo Li; Qian Li
We evaluate a reform of the US tax system switching to consumption taxation instead of income taxation. We do so in an environment that allows for progressivity of consumption taxes through differential tax rates between basic and non-basic consumption goods. The optimal tax system involves substantial subsidies to the consumption of basic goods. We find large efficiency gains in the long run, with a very small increase in inequality. However, once we consider the transitional dynamics associated to the reform, only very low productivity households and a handful of high productivity low wealth households experience welfare gains.
Thus, it appears that taxing the source of well-being of households, consumption, is worse than taxing their main source of revenue for said consumption. Of course, there is still the option to differentiate further the tax rates for the non-basic consumption goods. Sin and Pigovian taxes are welfare-enhancing after all.
October 10, 2018
By Rachel Moore and Brandon Pecoraro
Fiscal policy analysis in heterogeneous-agent models typically involves the use of smooth tax functions to approximate present tax law and proposed reforms. We argue that the tax detail omitted under this conventional approach has macroeconomic implications relevant for policy analysis. In this paper, we develop an alternative approach by embedding an internal tax calculator into a large-scale overlapping generations model that explicitly models key provisions in the Internal Revenue Code applied to labor income. While both approaches generate similar policy-induced patterns of economic activity, we find that the similarities mask differences in key economic aggregates and welfare due to variation in the underlying distribution of household labor supply responses. Absent sufficient tax detail, analysis of specific policy changes – particularly those involving large, discrete effects on a relatively small group of households – using heterogeneous-agent models can be unreliable.
Important lesson for those modelling taxation in some detail: do not take shortcuts, they matter.
October 10, 2018
By Ryan Chahrour and Rosen Valchev
The United States enjoys an “exorbitant privilege” that allows it to borrow at especially low interest rates. Meanwhile, the dollarization of world trade appears to shield the U.S. from international disturbances. We provide a new theory that links dollarization and exorbitant privilege through the need for an international medium of exchange. We consider a two-country world where international trade happens in decentralized matching markets, and must be collateralized by safe assets — a.k.a. currencies — issued by one of the two countries. Traders have an incentive to coordinate their currency choices and a single dominant currency arises in equilibrium. With small heterogeneity in traders’ information, the model delivers a unique mapping from economic conditions to the dominant currency. Nevertheless, the model delivers a dynamic multiplicity: in steady-state either currency can serve as the international medium of exchange. The economy with the dominant currency enjoys lower interest rates and the ability to run current account deficits indefinitely. Currency regimes are stable, but sufficiently large shocks or policy changes can lead to transitions, with large welfare implications.
Many in the United States do not realize their luck, as the exorbitant privilege is quite substantial. This paper finds this advantage amounts to about of 2% consumption, in large part thanks to the ability to keep a substantially lower net asset position. While this privilege is relatively stable, one can lose it if you rock the boat too much, though.
October 10, 2018
By Silvio Rendon and J. Ignacio García-Pérez
We develop and estimate a model of family job search and wealth accumulation. Individuals’ job finding and job separations depend on their partners’ job turnover and wages as well as common wealth. We fit this model to data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). This dataset reveals a very asymmetric labor market for household members, who share that their job finding is stimulated by their partners’ job separation, particularly during economic downturns. We uncover a job search-theoretic basis for this added worker effect. We also show that this effect is robust to having more children in the household, but that this effect and the interdependency between household members is underestimated if wealth and savings are not considered. Moreover, our analysis shows that the policy goal of supporting job search by increasing unemployment transfers is partially offset by the partner’s cross-effect in lower unemployment and wages.
Information is very important in job search, and this paper shows that this starts within the family. Of course, job risk within a couple leads to joint decisions about the job market, but the data here seems to indicate this goes beyond that.